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Abstract. This paper introduces an approach for formally verifying the safety
of the flight controller of an octorotor platform. Our method involves finding
regions of the octorotor’s state space that are considered safe, and which can
be proven to be invariant with respect to the dynamics. Specifically, exponen-
tial barrier functions are used to construct candidate invariant regions near
desired commanded states. The proof that these regions are invariant is dis-
covered automatically using the dReal SMT solver, which ensures the accurate
command tracking of the octorotor to within a certain margin of error. Rotor
failures in which rotor thrusts become stuck at fixed values are considered and
accounted for via a pseudo-inverse control allocator. The safety of the control
allocator is verified in dReal by checking that the thrusts demanded by the
allocator never exceed the capability of the rotors. We apply our approach on
a specific octorotor example and verify the desired command tracking prop-
erties of the controller under normal conditions and various combinations of
rotor failures.
1. Introduction
Recently, interest in the study of multirotor air vehicles has been growing quickly
due to their high maneuverability and many applications, such as inspection and
surveillance. In particular, the quadrotor has been a popular platform with which
to conduct UAV (unmanned aerial vehicle) research. While the quadrotor can
tolerate partial rotor faults (see, e.g., [23, 32, 20, 31]), it becomes uncontrollable if
one of its rotors fails completely (though [5] shows that only yaw control need be
lost). Thus the octorotor has been studied as an alternative that is more robust to
rotor failures [14, 1, 2, 21, 22].
An approach to addressing flight safety for UAVs in a number of recent works has
been through the use of control barrier functions (CBFs). A CBF is a scalar-valued
function on the state space of a control system whose support (here understood as
the region where the function attains positive values) is forward invariant under
appropriate controls. Thus, one can (mathematically) guarantee the safety of the
system by finding a CBF with support contained in a safe region of the state space.
In particular, in [24], CBFs are used to ensure that teams of quadrotors are able
to fly in a collision free manner; in [18], CBFs are used for obstacle avoidance in
quadrotor path planning in a surveillance scenario; and in [28], CBFs are used
for flight safety for quadrotors under some degree of human control. Other works
using barrier functions for UAV safety include [27, 26, 11]. Other applications of
barrier functions include adaptive cruise control and lane keeping [4, 30, 29], bipedal
walking robots [16, 15], and collision avoidance for multirobot systems on land [25].
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Instead of utilizing barrier functions within control algorithms to ensure safety, as
in the aforementioned references, the focus of this paper is to use barrier functions to
analyze the safety properties of conventionally defined controllers. Specifically, our
aim is to provide a method of verifying the safety of controllers using satisfiability
modulo theories (SMT) solving. Our work is in the spirit of [9, 10], in which
controllers for flight vehicles are designed, and the flight envelope and asymptotic
stability of the controller are verified by the automated theorem prover MetiTarski.
However, in these works, the design of the controllers is fairly specialized, and
is closely tied together with how the controller’s safety is verified. As above, a
principal goal of our work is to decouple safety analysis from controller design so
that our techniques can be employed even in cases where the underlying controller
can no longer be modified or where it is for other reasons not feasible to incorporate
barrier functions at the design stage.
The goal of this paper is therefore to introduce another approach to the formal
verification of the flight envelope of a UAV, one particularly that has the potential
to be used in a way that is independent of the design of the controller. Our core
method involves the use of barrier functions, more specifically exponential barrier
functions [17] of a certain form, to produce an invariant subset of a prescribed safe
region near a desired commanded point in the control system’s state space (e.g., as
one might see in connection with gain scheduling). Our method aims to analyze
systems with a controller designed to track commands and whose dynamics can
be approximated reasonably well by the linearization around a desired operating
state. In particular, our approach lends itself well to analyzing UAV safety in states
where the vehicle is nearly upright or mildly tilting. It also has potential for use in
the verification of gain scheduled controllers that are currently in common use for
many kinds of aircraft.
The specific type of UAV we analyze is an octorotor, which, as mentioned above,
is robust to rotor failures. This allows us to address the issue of fault tolerance
in our approach. We account for complete rotor failures, in which one or more
rotors stop working entirely and exert zero thrust, and more generally failures in
which rotors become stuck at specific speeds. To mitigate these failures, we utilize
a simple control allocator to attempt to maintain the ideal octorotor behavior. The
main property of the control allocator that needs to be verified is that the rotors
are always capable of exerting the rotor thrusts commanded by the allocator. We
assume that failures are perfectly known, and do not address the issue of fault
detection, as in [21, 22].
In Section 2, we present the equations of motion of the octorotor model we study.
In Section 3, we describe the controller. This includes an explanation of the kinds
of rotor failures considered and how they are accounted for by the control allocator.
Section 4 introduces the general barrier function framework employed, and Section
5 describes precisely the form of barrier functions used for the octorotor. In Section
6, we formulate in detail the properties that are analyzed in dReal and that confirm
the desired safety properties of the octorotor controller. In Section 7, we describe
the results obtained for a specific controller: we formally verify that the octorotor
will follow commands closely in spite of dynamic disturbances when functioning
normally and under various rotor failures, and we identify some combinations of
rotor failures in which the desired conditions are violated. Finally, concluding
remarks are found in Section 8.
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2. Octorotor dynamics model
In this section, we describe the octorotor dynamics model that we analyze. We
follow [7, 12] in modeling the rigid body dynamics and some characteristics of
the rotors, and our octorotor model is based on that in [14]. See also [13] for an
introduction to the modeling of multirotor aerial vehicles. The octorotor consists
of eight identical rotors arranged in the shape of a regular octagon as illustrated in
Figure 1. Each rotor exerts an upward thrust normal to the plane of the octorotor,
and a torque about the octorotor’s center of mass as explained below.
To express the octorotor’s dynamics, we first describe the two reference frames
required. First, the world reference frame, which we assume is inertial, is given by
the standard unit basis vectors e1 = [1, 0, 0]
T , e2 = [0, 1, 0]
T , and e3 = [0, 0, 1]
T .
We assume that e1 points north, e2 points east, and e3 points down. Next, we
assume that the body of the octorotor has reference frame given by the orthonormal
(vertical) vectors b1, b2, b3, where b1 is considered the forward direction with respect
to the octorotor, b2 is the right direction, and b3 is the down direction. (In Figure
1, b3 points into the page.) The 3 × 3 matrix [b1, b2, b3] is denoted by R, which is
the rotation matrix from the body frame to the world frame.
Now we describe the state space of the system. We denote the inertial position
of the octorotor’s center of mass by r = [x, y, z]T ; and the inertial velocity by
v = [vx, vy, vz]
T . Another component of the state of the octorotor is its orientation,
which is given by R. Alternatively, we express the orientation in terms of Euler
angles. Letting φ, θ, ψ be the roll, pitch, and yaw angles, respectively, corresponding
to the Z-Y -X sequence for Euler angles, we have the following relationship between
R and [φ, θ, ψ]:
R =
cψ −sψ 0sψ cψ 0
0 0 1
 cθ 0 sθ0 1 0
−sθ 0 cθ




cθcψ sφsθcψ − cφsψ cφsθcψ + sφsψcθsψ sφsθsψ + cφsψ cφsθsψ − sφcψ
−sθ sφcθ cφcθ
 .
Here and below, we let s∗ = sin(∗), c∗ = cos(∗), and t∗ = tan(∗). The final
component of the state space is the angular velocity vector Ω = [Ω1,Ω2,Ω3]
T of
the octorotor with respect to the body reference frame.
Next, we describe the control space of the octorotor. The control space consists
of the eight rotors, each of which exerts a force and torque on the octorotor. For
simplicity, we assume that the thrust of each rotor can be directly set, and we
do not model the motor dynamics. Also, we assume that each rotor can rotate
only in one direction as shown in Figure 1, and that the thrust exerted is in the
upward direction −b3 with respect to the octorotor. Let fj , j = 1, . . . , 8, denote
the forces exerted by the rotors. We assume that each fj is restricted to an interval
[fmin, fmax], where fmin and fmax are the least and greatest possible forces that
each rotor can exert on the octorotor, respectively. Since we are assuming that the
rotors can only rotate in one direction, we have fmin ≥ 0. Let d denote the distance
from the center of mass of the octorotor to the center of each rotor, and note that
the thrust of the jth rotor induces a torque of magnitude d · fj about an axis in
the octorotor plane perpendicular to the arm containing the rotor. The jth rotor
also induces a torque about the b3 axis of magnitude c · fj , where c is the ratio
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Figure 1. Octorotor diagram
of induced torque to thrust. In particular, the rotors that rotate counterclockwise
induce a torque in the direction of b3, and those that rotate clockwise induce a
torque in the direction of −b3.
Let F denote the total thrust exerted by the rotors, and let τ1, τ2, τ3 denote
the net torque exerted by the rotors about the body axes b1, b2, b3, respectively.
Then letting γ = π8 , the relationship between u = [F, τ1, τ2, τ3]
T and fall =
[f1, f2, . . . , f8]
T is given by u = Λfall, where Λ is the matrix 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1dsγ −dsγ −dcγ −dcγ −dsγ dsγ dcγ dcγdcγ dcγ dsγ −dsγ −dcγ −dcγ −dsγ dsγ
c c −c −c c c −c −c
.
Next, let m ∈ R denote the mass of the octorotor, g = 9.81 ms2 be the gravitational
acceleration, and
J =
J1 0 00 J2 0
0 0 J3

be the inertia matrix of the octorotor with respect to its body frame. Then let
∆r = [∆x,∆y,∆z]
T and ∆R = [∆R,1,∆R,2,∆R,3]
T denote unstructured force and
torque disturbances due to dynamics that are unaccounted for. In particular, we
view these disturbances as encompassing aerodynamic effects such as air drag and
blade flapping, which, for simplicity, we do not model in detail. (See, e.g., [8, 13]
for more information.) We assume the disturbances are unknown, untracked, and
measurable functions of time, and satisfy the inequalities |∆x|, |∆y|, |∆z| ≤ ∆r,max,
and |∆R,1|, |∆R,2| ≤ ∆R,12,max, |∆R,3| ≤ ∆R,3,max, where ∆r,max, ∆R,12,max, and
∆R,3,max are fixed bounds. Then the differential equations describing the motion
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Figure 2. Octorotor system block diagram





















JΩ̇ = τ − Ω× JΩ + ∆R.
In this paper, we focus on the dynamics of the components of the state vector
s = [vz, φ, θ, ψ,Ω1,Ω2,Ω3]
T ,
which we consider to be the “inner loop” components of the octorotor system. Note
that the derivative of these components do not depend on [x, y, z, vx, vy], and so we
may safely view the components of s as forming the state space of a well-defined
control system.
3. Controller
As mentioned above, we focus on controlling the dynamics of the octorotor’s
vertical velocity and orientation. In particular, the controller we use is designed
to have the components (vz, φ, θ, ψ) of the octorotor state track the command
(vz,d, φd, θd, ψd). In other words, we wish for s to track sd = [vz,d, φd, θd, ψd, 0, 0, 0]
T .
The block diagram of the full control system is shown in Figure 2.
The controller consists of two components. The first, block K in the diagram,
takes as input the difference sd − s between the current state and the commanded
state, and returns the commanded vector ud = [Fd, τ1,d, τ2,d, τ3,d]
T of net force and
torques. This component disregards whether the octorotor is actually capable of
executing ud, that is, whether there exists a valid fall which yields the desired
command. So ud is not necessarily the actual control input u = [F, τ1, τ2, τ3]
T .
To find u, we include a second component, the control allocator, which takes ud
as input and returns a value for fall such that fmin ≤ fj ≤ fmax for all j and
the resulting control input u = Λfall is intended to equal, or be close to, ud.
Note additionally that we use the control allocator to implement rotor failures.
Specifically, we assume that the rotor failures are always known and the control
allocator is defined so that the thrusts fj corresponding to the failed rotors match
the values at which they are stuck.
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While under some circumstances the commanded value ud is not equal to u, we
want to ensure this never happens for the purposes of verifying safety. In particular,
we wish to find an invariant set for which all the commanded values ud can be
executed by the octorotor. This allows us to split up our verification procedure
into 2 separate steps as follows. The first step is to verify that a chosen candidate
invariant set is rendered invariant by the controller under the assumption that u is
always equal to ud. The second step is to verify that the equality u = ud is in fact
satisfied for the control allocator for all states in the candidate invariant set. This
step is done for each rotor failure combination analyzed.
3.1. Controller block K. The block K controller component has a simple PD






τ1,d = −Kpφ(φ− φd)−KdφΩ1
τ2,d = −Kpθ(θ − θd)−KdθΩ2
τ3,d = −Kpψ(ψ − ψd)−KdψΩ3.
Note that mg/cφcθ is the total rotor thrust needed to keep the vertical acceleration
of the octorotor at 0. We take the various coefficients K· from a linear quadratic
regulator that we compute for the linearized octorotor dynamics at s = 0, and under
the assumption that vz,d, φd, θd, ψd,∆r,max, ∆R,12,max,∆R,3,max are all equal to 0.
3.2. Control allocator. To find the individual rotor thrusts exerted by the octoro-
tor in response to the commanded control input ud, we use a simple pseudo-inverse
control allocation method (see [19]). At this stage, we account for the possibil-
ity that some of the rotors have failed. So let W ⊆ {1, . . . , 8} be the (possibly
empty) set of indices corresponding to rotors that have failed, and for j ∈ W , let
f̄j ∈ [fmin, fmax] be thrust at which rotor j is stuck. Also let f̄j = 0 for j /∈ W
and f̄all = [f̄1, . . . , f̄8]
T . Next, define ΛW to be the matrix with the same entries
as Λ, except that column j of ΛW is zeroed out for all j ∈W . Then let Λ†W be the
pseudo-inverse of ΛW . Now we define f̃all = [f̃1, . . . , f̃8]
T by
(2) f̃all = f̄all + Λ
†
W (ud − Λf̄all).
The vector f̃all consists of potential rotor values, with f̃j = f̄j for all j ∈ W as
required. However, it is possible that f̃j falls outside [fmin, fmax] for some j /∈ W .
We thus define fj for j = 1, . . . , 8 by
fj =
{
f̄j if j ∈W
mid{fmin, f̃j , fmax} if j /∈W ,
where mid{fmin, f̃j , fmax} denotes the middle value of the set {fmin, f̃j , fmax}.
Thus fj ∈ [fmin, fmax] for all j /∈ W , and so we let fall = [f1, . . . , f8]T . This
completes the definition of the control allocator.
To conclude this section, we wish to describe conditions for which u = ud. We
first note that the matrix ΛW is of rank 4 if |W | < 4, or |W | = 4 and W is not
equal to {1, 2, 3, 8}, {1, 2, 4, 7}, {1, 2, 5, 6}, or any index set that can be obtained
from one of these sets by increasing each element by a common even number and
taking the remainder upon division by 8 when necessary. (This is equivalent to
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rotating the rotor failure patterns corresponding to the 3 sets about the octorotor
center by multiples of 90 degrees.) When ΛW is of rank 4, we have ΛWΛ
†
W = I4×4
and Λf̃all = ud. So to determine whether u = ud, it suffices to check whether
f̃j ∈ [fmin, fmax] for all j /∈ W , and this is the condition we use, since we only
consider scenarios with up to 2 rotor failures.
4. Barrier Functions
The safety conditions that we wish to prove rely on the notion of invariant sets.
An invariant set for a dynamical system is a region I of the state space of the system
such that if the state begins in I, then the state remains in I at all future times.
Our goal is to ensure that for all commands sd one wishes to give the octorotor,
there exists an invariant set of octorotor states s which are close to sd. Obtaining
and verifying such invariant sets allows one to gauge with certainty how close the
controller is able to keep the octorotor state to the given commands in spite of the
disturbances given in the dynamics model.
To find these invariant sets, we utilize barrier functions. The type of barrier
function we use is a form of exponential barrier function as introduced by [17].
(See, in particular, Remark 5, Proposition 1, and the related discussion.) With
this concept, we find a set of linear inequalities on the state space which forms a
candidate invariant region which we can verify. In this section, we provide a brief
overview of the reasoning behind exponential barrier functions, and then explain
the general form of exponential barrier functions we use.
Let ẋ = f(x) define a dynamical system on some set X ⊆ Rn, and let h = h0 :
X → R be a differentiable function. The basic logic underlying exponential barrier
functions is that, for a trajectory x(t) of the dynamical system, h(x(t)) ≥ 0 for all




= (∇h)(x(t)) · f(x(t)) + p1h(x(t)) ≥ 0
for all t ≥ 0, where p1 > 0 is a constant. Thus, if one seeks an invariant subset
of {x ∈ X : h(x) ≥ 0}, one can, if necessary, enforce the extra inequality h1(x) :=
(∇h)(x) · f(x) + p1h(x) ≥ 0, and form the set {x ∈ X : h0(x), h1(x) ≥ 0}. If
one can then prove that whenever the initial condition is chosen from this set, the
inequality h1(x) ≥ 0 holds indefinitely, then h0(x) ≥ 0 holds automatically. One
can furthermore inductively form a sequence of functions hj defined by hj(x) =
(∇hj−1)(x) · f(x) + pjhj−1(x) and examine the sets {x ∈ X : hj(x) ≥ 0, j =
0, . . . , n} to see if any of them are invariant, and in particular, checking if the
inequality hn(x) ≥ 0 holds indefinitely when h0(x), . . . , hn(x) ≥ 0 holds at the
initial condition. See [17] for more details regarding the reasoning above in the
context of controlled dynamical systems.
In light of the above discussion, we now explain the general barrier function
framework we use in constructing invariant sets for the octorotor. It relies on a
few starting assumptions. First, we assume that a controller is already in place
(namely, one of the form described in Section 3), which seeks to track a fixed
commanded state, and the dynamics are governed by a differential equation of the
form ẋ = f(x, xd, d), where x ∈ Rn is the state, xd ∈ Rd is the commanded state,
d ∈ Rm denotes any potential disturbances (all three being vertical vectors), and
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f is Lipschitz on any candidate invariant set of interest. Next, we assume that
the dynamics can be approximated sufficiently well by a linearization of the form
ẋ = A(x− xd), A ∈ Rn×n. In the case of the octorotor, we assume A results from
the linearization of the dynamics where s = 0. Next, we assume that the conditions
we desire to be enforced are of the form Pi(x−xd)+Di ≥ 0, where Pi is a horizontal
vector of length n, and Di is a positive scalar. The aim of these inequalities is to
form a starting set of states x nearby xd in which to find an invariant set. The goal
is then to confirm the ability of the controller to keep the state x near xd.
Now we form a sequence of barrier functions that aim to enforce Pi(x−xd)+Di ≥
0. First, we let pi,j , δi,j ≥ 0 be constants for j = 1, . . . , ni such that
∑ni
j=1 δi,j < Di.
Then we define the sequence of functions
h̃i,0(x) =Pi(x− xd) +Di
h̃i,1(x) =Pi(I + pi,1A)(x− xd) +Di − δi,1
h̃i,2(x) =Pi(I + pi,1A)(I + pi,2A)(x− xd)
+Di − δi,1 − δi,2
...
h̃i,ni(x) =Pi(I + pi,1A) · · · (I + pi,niA)(x− xd)
+Di − δi,1 − · · · − δi,ni .
where I is the n × n identity matrix. Notice that under the linear dynamics,
h̃i,j(x) ≤ h̃i,j−1(x) + pi,j ddt (h̃i,j−1(x)) for j = 1, . . . , ni, and so if the inequality
h̃i,j ≥ 0 holds, then h̃i,j−1 holds automatically. Next, we let µ > 0 be a parameter










Pi(I + pi,1A)(I + pi,2A)(x− xd)




Pi(I + pi,1A) · · · (I + pi,niA)(x− xd)
Di − δi,1 − · · · − δi,ni
+ µ,
and notice that hi,j,1 is a postive scalar multiple of h̃i,j . We refer to the number ni
as the depth of the above sequence. Then I(µ) = {x : hi,j,µ(x) ≥ 0,∀i,∀j} forms
a parameterized family of candidate invariant sets, and I(1) in particular is the
candidate set that enforces the conditions Pi(x−xd) +Di ≥ 0. The purpose of the
parameter µ is to allow one to potentially establish a region of attraction for I(1)
by showing that when the initial system state is in I(µmax) for some µmax > 1, the
state will enter I(µ) for smaller and smaller µ over time until it reaches I(1).
In order the confirm whether I(µ) is actually invariant for µ ∈ [1, µmax], it is
sufficient to check that for all x ∈ I(µmax), we have that, for all i and j, hi,j,µ(x) = 0
implies that ddt (hi,j,µ(x)) > 0. We shall refer to this implication as the invariance
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condition for hi,j,µ. Under this condition, it is clear that the least µ satisfying
hi,j,µ(x) ≥ 0 decreases with respect to time while µ ≥ 1.
One may notice that under the linearized dynamics, it is only necessary to
check the invariance condition for hi,ni,µ for all i, since in this case, the fact that
hi,ni,µ(x) ≥ 0 holds implies that hi,j,µ(x) ≥ 0 holds for all j ≤ ni. This continues
to be true if we let δi,j = 0 for all i and j. However, since we are interested in
verifying invariance for the original nonlinear dynamics, it is necessary to check the
invariance conditions for all functions. Also, under the nonlinear dynamics, the
fact that hi,j,µ(x) ≥ 0 holds may not automatically imply that hi,j−1,µ(x) ≥ 0 for
δi,j = 0, though this issue can be mitigated by increasing δi,j .
To conclude this section, we remark that in the case where I(µ) is proven to be
invariant for µ ∈ [1, µmax], it is straightforward to check for an expanded region of
attraction for I(1) by verifying the invariance conditions for µ ∈ [µmax, µ̃max], where
µ̃max > µmax; and similarly one can check to see if there are smaller invariant sets
inside I(1) by verifying the invariance conditions for µ ∈ [µmin, 1], for µmin ∈ (0, 1).
One can then in a systematic way, e.g., through a bisection method, approximate
the exact µ-interval over which the invariant conditions are satisfied as accurately as
desired; though SMT solving time may limit the accuracy one can feasibly obtain.
5. Octorotor Barrier Functions
In this section, we describe in more detail the form of the barrier functions
we use for the octorotor system. As mentioned above, the approximating linear
dynamics we use is the linearization around s = 0. Conveniently, this approximation
decomposes into 4 subsystems. The first subsystem consists of only the vertical
velocity vz. The nonlinear equation governing vz, without disturbances, is















One of our goals is to ensure that |vz − vz,d| ≤ Dvz for some constant Dvz > 0,
assuming the bound |vz,d| ≤ Dvz,d with Dvz,d > 0. So we define our barrier function
components for vz by




one barrier function corresponding to + and one to −. This means that we do not
make use of barrier functions of higher depth to enforce |vz − vz,d| ≤ Dvz .
The next subsystem consists of the roll angle and rate (φ,Ω1). The nonlinear
equations governing these variables, without disturbances, are
φ̇ = Ω1 + tθ(sφΩ2 + cφΩ3), Ω̇1 =
τ1 + Ω2Ω3(J2 − J3)
J1
.
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Linearizing and combining with the controller (1) yields




Another goal is to ensure that |φ − φd| ≤ Dφ for some Dφ > 0, assuming that
|φd| ≤ Dφd , Dφd > 0, and we aim to enforce the first inequality with barrier
function sequences of depth 1. So for constants pφ,1, δφ,1 ≥ 0 with δφ,1 < Dφ, we
define our barrier function components for (φ,Ω1) as the following:




h±φ,1,µ(s, φd) = ±
φ− φd + pφ,1Ω1
Dφ − δφ,1
+ µ.
There are two remaining subsystems, one of which consists of the pitch angle
and rate (θ,Ω2), and the other consists of the yaw angle and rate (ψ,Ω3). Both
subsystems are very similar to that of the roll angle and rate. The nonlinear
equations governing the dynamics of these variables are




τ2 + Ω1Ω3(J3 − J1)
J2
, Ω̇3 =
τ3 + Ω1Ω2(J1 − J2)
J3
.
Linearizing and then combining these equations with the controller (1) yields
θ̇ = Ω2, Ω̇2 =
−Kpθ(θ − θd)−KdθΩ2
J2




Our goals for these variables is to ensure that |θ− θd| ≤ Dθ and |ψ−ψd| ≤ Dψ for
some Dθ, Dψ > 0, assuming that |θd| ≤ Dθd and |ψd| ≤ Dψd , Dθd , Dψd > 0. As
with the roll angle and rate, we utilize barrier function sequences of depth 1. So
for constants pθ,1, δθ,1, pψ,1, δψ,1 ≥ 0 with δθ,1 < Dθ and δψ,1 < Dψ, we define the
barrier function components for (θ,Ω2) and (ψ,Ω3) as the following:




h±θ,1,µ(s, θd) = ±
θ − θd + pθ,1Ω2
Dθ − δθ,1
+ µ




h±ψ,1,µ(s, ψd) = ±
ψ − ψd + pψ,1Ω3
Dψ − δψ,1
+ µ.
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Lastly, we also include the following functions to ensure bounds of the form |Ω1| ≤













This completes the description of all the barrier functions.
6. Verification process
We will now formulate the statements about the octorotor system that we for-
mally analyze in dReal. The dReal SMT solver [6] is capable of analyzing state-
ments in the theory of first-order real arithmetic with non-linear function symbols
(including, crucially, transcendental functions) in order to determine their satisfia-
bility. In order to overcome well-known decidability issues with this theory, dReal
incorporates a numerical precision constant that mediates the granularity of the
proof search. Given a statement ϕ in this theory, dReal will reply with one of the
following:
• An assignment of ranges (intervals) to the (free) variables of ϕ that make
the statement satisfiable modulo the numerical precision; or
• A proof that there is no assignment that would make ϕ satisfiable.
The first case is referred to as a δ-SAT result. The second case is referred to as
an UNSAT result. In general, it is not possible to determine, given the assignment
corresponding to a δ-SAT result whether or not there are values in the range of the
assignment that would make the statement satisfiable. However, one can sample
from these intervals and evaluate the results in order to further search for a gen-
uinely satisfiable (SAT ) result. In practice, when running dReal we always carry
out a näıve search within δ-SAT ranges by polling the midpoint of the returned box.
Thus, in the sequel SAT means that we have found a genuine counter-example via
this further polling of the variable ranges returned as part of one of dReal’s δ-SATs.
We always formulate safety properties in such a way that the goal is to obtain an
UNSAT result, i.e., a proof of unsatisfiability, from dReal.
First, we introduce a constant ε, a small positive number that we use for various
purposes, one of which is to make our safety conditions slightly more strict to
account for potential numerical errors. Next, we define a search space over which
the statements we formulate are proven. In particular, we restrict all of the following
variables to a symmetric interval about 0:1
vz, φ, θ, ψ,Ω1,Ω2,Ω3,∆z,∆R,1,∆R,2,∆R,3, vz,d, φd, θd, ψd.
That is, for all variables ξ above, we restrict ξ to lie in the interval (−ξmax, ξmax),
where ξmax > 0. We also restrict the variable µ to the interval (1 − ε, µmax + ε).
This ensures that dReal conducts a well bounded search, which avoids unnecessary
computational issues. As mentioned above, all conditions are expressed in terms of
1The regions could be asymmetric and for other kinds of tasks that might be more natural.
For the task at hand, symmetry of the regions is most reasonable.
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a search for a state which violates the desired safety condition. The aim is then to
use dReal to verify that such a violation cannot exist, which proves the condition.
6.1. Barrier function support is inside search space. Now the first thing
we wish to ensure is that the common support of the barrier functions we define
is a subset of our search space. This is because it is necessary to search over
the full boundary of the support when checking invariance. For this property, we
formulate the dReal search as follows. We search for a state s near the boundary
of the search space —i.e., satisfying ξ > ξmax − ε or ξ < −ξmax + ε for some
ξ ∈ {vz, φ, θ, ψ,Ω1,Ω2,Ω3}— such that there exists a barrier function component h
and, if needed, associated command c such that s is in or near the support of h(·, c),
i.e., h(s, c) > −ε. If h has no argument for a command c, then the last inequality
should be replaced by h(s) > −ε. If dReal verifies that no such state s exists, then
we can conclude that the full support is inside the search space.
6.2. Invariance of barrier function support. Next, we formulate the condi-
tions for checking that the barrier function support is invariant, and we do this
by checking the invariance property for each barrier function component. Here we
are assuming that the controller defined by (1) always works, i.e., u = ud and we
disregard the rotor thrust limits. Also, we assume that the states s we search over
are in or near the support of every barrier function component, i.e., for all barrier
function components h, we have h(s, c) > −ε for some associated command c, if
such a command is needed, or otherwise h(s) > −ε. With these assumptions in
mind, we formulate one condition for each barrier function component. For the
component h∗, we search for a state s and, if needed, a command c associated with
h∗ such that s is on or near the boundary of the support of h∗(·, c) (or h∗(s)), i.e.,
−ε < h∗(s, c) < ε (or −ε < h∗(x) < ε), and the time derivative of h∗(s, c) (or h∗(s))
is almost negative, i.e., ddt (h∗(s, c)) < ε (or
d
dt (h∗(s)) < ε). For the sake of clarity,
the condition we impose on the state s to consider it a violation of the invariance
condition for h∗ is the following:(
for every b.f. component h, there exists an




there exists a command c associated to h∗
such that h∗(s, c) < ε and
d
dt (h∗(s, c)) < ε
)
.
For h or h∗ that has no argument for a command in the above expression, we
disregard the corresponding command c and replace h(s, c) with h(s), or h∗(s, c)
with h∗(s). If, for every barrier function component h∗, there is no state s that
satisfies the above condition, then the barrier function support is invariant under
the controller defined by (1).
6.3. Rotor thrust bounds. The last condition we check is the equality u = ud
we assumed in the previous condition. More specifically, we wish to check whether
this equality is true over the support of the given barrier function and under the
rotor failure combination being considered. As explained in Section 3.2, it suffices
to check whether the thrusts f̃j of the non-failed rotors given by the allocation
method are valid and stay within the interval [fmin, fmax], that is, as long as
rank(ΛW ) = 4. We formulate a condition for each combination of rotor failures,
so let W ⊆ {1, . . . , 8} such that rank(ΛW ) = 4. It is clear we can consider ud a
function of s by definition; and as a result, by (2) we can view f̃all as a function
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of s. With this in mind, we can formulate our search as follows. We search for
a state s such that for every barrier function component h, h(s, c) > −ε for some
corresponding command c (or h(s) > −ε), and additionally, for some j /∈ W , f̃j is
outside, or nearly outside, of [fmin, fmax], i.e., f̃j − fmax > −ε or f̃j − fmin < ε. If
dReal verifies that no such state s exists, then the octorotor controller behaves as
intended for the rotor failure combination being analyzed.
7. Results
We apply our verification process to an octorotor model with the characteristics
of that in [14]. Specifically, the octorotor model has mass m = 1.2 kg, inertia
matrix entries J1 = J2 = 7.5× 10−3 kg ·m2 and J3 = 1.3× 10−2 kg ·m2, arm length
d = 0.4 m, and torque-to-thrust ratio c = ( 7.53.13 )× 10
−2 m. Additionally, we let the
minimum and maximum rotor thrusts be fmin = 0 and fmax =
1
2mg, and let the
maximum disturbance magnitudes be ∆r,max =
1
10mg, ∆R,12,max = (0.6
rad
s2 )J1,
and ∆R,3,max = (0.6
rad
s2 )J3.
Next, to find the coefficients of the controller (1), we compute the linear quadratic
regulator for the linearization of the octorotor system at s = 0, while assuming
that sd = 0 and neglecting the disturbances ∆r,∆R. Specifically, we find the linear
controller that minimizes the objective function∫ ∞
0
(sTQs+ |u|2) dt,






















under the linearized dynamics. The resulting coefficients in (1) are then (approxi-
mately) as follows:
(3)
Kdz = 6.32, Kpφ = Kpθ = Kpψ = 0.5,
Kdφ = Kdθ = 0.364, Kdψ = 0.371.
Next, to define the barrier function components, we make the following assign-
ments:
Dvz = 0.25, Dvz,d = 1, Dφ = Dθ = Dψ = 0.05,
Dφd = Dθd = 0.15, Dψd = ε, DΩ1 = DΩ2 = DΩ3 = 0.09,
pφ,1 = pθ,1 = pψ,1 = 0.7, δφ,1 = δθ,1 = δψ,1 = 0.017,
µmax = 2.
This means that the command vz,d is allowed to span the interval (−1, 1), and
φd and θd are allowed to span (−0.15, 0.15). Note that there is no loss in letting
Dψd = ε, hence ψd ≈ 0, since one can always redefine coordinates so that ψd = 0.
Also, for any combination of commands, the candidate invariant set resulting from
the barrier functions is the set I(1) of states s such that |vz−vz,d| ≤ 0.25, (φ,Ω1) ∈
Sφd , (θ,Ω2) ∈ Sθd , and (ψ,Ω3) ∈ Sψd , where
Sαd =
{
(α, ω) ∈ R2 : |α− αd| ≤ 0.05, |ω| ≤ 0.09
|α− αd + 0.7ω| ≤ 0.033
}
.
The set Sαd is the dark blue region illustrated in Figure 3. The light blue region is
the dilation of Sαd by a factor of 2, and corresponds to the region of attraction for
the invariant set. Lastly, we let ε = 10−8.
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Figure 3. The region Sαd
With all of the above definitions, we used dReal to obtain a proof of safety in the
case of no rotor failures, as well as many combinations of rotor failures. That is, we
used dReal to successfully verify that the set I(µ) is invariant for 1 ≤ µ ≤ 2 under
the controller (1) with coefficients (3), and that the octorotor is capable of executing
the controller’s actions under various rotor failure combinations. Table 1 shows the
times it took to prove the various conditions that ensure safety in the case where
there are no rotor failures. Recall that UNSAT cases correspond to safety proofs
found and SAT cases correspond to concrete counter-examples found. (Note that
there is a small discrepancy between the sum of the times of the individual steps
and the total time since the latter is the run time for a single script that performed
all the steps in the table, and a small portion of the script is not taken into account
in the recorded times for the steps.) Additionally, Table 2 shows the various times
it takes to check whether the individual rotor thrusts f̃j stay in [fmin, fmax] for
various rotor failure combinations, in which failed rotors exert zero thrust, i.e.,
they experience complete failures. In particular, note that the octorotor remains
safe for up to two rotor failures, except when the failures occur on adjacent rotors
that rotate the same direction. Lastly, Table 3 shows the times it takes to check the
individual rotor thrust bounds for rotor failures where the thrusts of failed rotors
can get stuck at zero or nonzero values. (Note that µmax = 2 for all entries except
where µmax is specified, in which case µmax was decreased in order to obtain an
UNSAT.) All times were obtained using 16 cores.
8. Conclusion
This paper introduces a framework for the formal verification of the safety of
control systems using exponential barrier functions, with the target application of
ensuring the faithful command tracking of an octorotor controller. Our method uses
barrier functions to construct candidate invariant sets for the octorotor dynamics,
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Table 1. Run times for checking safety conditions for no rotor failures
Step Precision SAT/UNSAT
Proof times (with 16 cores)
real user sys
Search space contains b.f. support 10−2 UNSAT 0m0.015s - -
Invariance, vz b.f. components 10−2 UNSAT 0m0.165s - -
Invariance, φ,Ω1 b.f. components 10−2 UNSAT 253m20.942s - -
Invariance, θ,Ω2 b.f. components 10−2 UNSAT 253m41.323s - -
Invariance, ψ,Ω3 b.f. components 10−2 UNSAT 0m0.055s - -
Rotor bounds (no rotor failures) 10−2 UNSAT 0m0.109s - -
Total time 507m3.938s 7576m43.915s 443m29.505s
Table 2. Run times for checking rotor bounds with complete rotor failures
Step: Rotor bounds under failures Precision SAT/UNSAT
Proof times (with 16 cores)
real user sys
Rotor 1 complete failure 10−2 UNSAT 0m0.925s 0m5.847s 0m4.571s
Rotor 1, 2 complete failures 10−5 SAT 0m0.818s 0m4.810s 0m4.687s
Rotor 1, 3 complete failures 10−2 UNSAT 0m0.923s 0m5.823s 0m4.594s
Rotor 1, 4 complete failures 10−2 UNSAT 0m0.910s 0m5.870s 0m4.416s
Rotor 1, 5 complete failures 10−2 UNSAT 0m0.803s 0m4.179s 0m3.971s
Rotor 1, 6 complete failures 10−2 UNSAT 0m0.898s 0m5.660s 0m4.343s
Rotor 1, 7 complete failures 10−2 UNSAT 0m0.893s 0m5.723s 0m4.313s
Rotor 1, 8 complete failures 10−2 UNSAT 0m1.035s 0m6.969s 0m4.322s
and invariance of these sets are then formally checked by the SMT solver dReal.
We account for potential rotor failures through a pseudo-inverse control allocator,
which we also verify to produce valid rotor thrusts via dReal. Using our approach,
we verify that a particular controller causes the octorotor to follow commands
within a certain margin of error under dynamic disturbances and several types
of rotor failures. Our approach is fairly general, and can potentially be used to
construct safe invariant sets in many different systems and using different kinds
of controllers. One particularly promising application is in the verification of gain
scheduled controllers for aircraft.
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